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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3613 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FREDDIE LAMONT CLECKLEY, 
             Appellant 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00246-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, VANASKIE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 28, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge 
 Freddie Lamont Cleckley appeals his sentence of 248 months’ imprisonment for 
drug and firearms offenses.  Finding no error in the District Court’s sentencing decisions, 
we will affirm the Judgment of the District Court. 
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I. 
 As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case, we relate only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
 Cleckley pleaded guilty to all counts in an indictment charging him with 
possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine (count one), 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count two), and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count three).  Cleckley’s Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”) initially calculated his net offense level at twenty-seven, 
which reflected a two-level enhancement on the ground the firearm he possessed was 
stolen.  Cleckley, however, qualified as a career offender under United States Sentencing 
Guidelines § 4B1.1, resulting in a net offense level of thirty-one and a criminal history 
category of VI.  Cleckley’s guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.  
Additionally, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), Cleckley’s minimum sentence for 
possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking was five years’ imprisonment, to 
run consecutively with the term of imprisonment for the drug trafficking offense. 
 Cleckley objected to the two-level enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, 
arguing that the government could not prove that the weapon had been stolen.  This 
enhancement, however, did not affect Cleckley’s guidelines range because his status as a 
career offender controlled.  Cleckley’s guidelines range would have been the same 
regardless of whether the firearm he possessed was stolen.  The District Court ruled on 
Cleckley’s objection by explaining that “the [stolen firearm] enhancement . . . does not 
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affect the calculation under the Career Offender guidelines.”  (A. 14.)  Cleckley did not 
object to his career offender status or his criminal history category. 
 The District Court ultimately sentenced Cleckley to concurrent terms of 188 and 
120 months’ imprisonment for counts one and three, respectively, and a consecutive term 
of sixty months’ imprisonment for count two, for a total prison term of 248 months.  At 
the sentencing hearing, the Court explained to Cleckley that his sentence resulted from 
the fact that he was “considered a career offender within the meaning of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”  (S.A. 26.)  Cleckley now appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Cleckley argues that the District Court failed to adhere to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) by neglecting to rule on his objection to the PSR’s finding that the 
firearm was stolen.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s compliance with 
Rule 32(i).  See United States v. Electrodyne Sys. Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 251-52 (3d Cir. 
1998).  The Rule requires a sentencing court to decide a dispute over a matter in a PSR 
“or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect 
sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).  The District Court plainly complied with the Rule by explaining 
that the enhancement for possessing a stolen handgun “does not affect the calculation 
under the Career Offender guidelines.”  (A. 14.) 
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 Cleckley next argues that we must vacate his sentence because the District Court 
violated Rule 32 by failing to state that Cleckley’s sentence would not be affected by 
whether the gun was stolen.  Again, the record belies Cleckley’s position:  the District 
Court clearly stated that the stolen firearm enhancement would not affect Cleckley’s 
sentence. 
 Because Cleckley’s status as a career offender, and not the gun’s status as a stolen 
firearm, controlled his sentence, we need not consider Cleckley’s remaining arguments 
that his PSR incorrectly determined that the firearm was in fact stolen and that his 
sentence must be vacated because the District Court relied on an incorrect PSR.  We will 
affirm the Judgment of the District Court.  
